Bruce Philpott, New Fire Models, Segment 5: Core Evidence of Delayed Emergency Responses

We are going to deviate from our normal presentation sequence this evening and resume the schedule next week. I have gotten some feedback from the public that tells me they want to see the actual evidence of these failed incidents on emergency medical responses as identified by a consultant hired by the Glendale Fire Department. The public wants to know how this could be and what specific facts I possess that would confirm my concerns that show a disturbing trend.

I understand more than most, having served in law enforcement for half of my life, that assumptions are not acceptable when you are dealing with such an issue as delayed emergency medical responses. Because I failed to establish this base line of evidence at the beginning of our presentations, I will do that this evening and then return to policy issues on staffing next week.

This information is of great importance to the public and it is paramount that the public be reassured that the information we are presenting is accurate.

I will be presenting scanned copies of the actual activity reports and dispatch logs that illustrate the delayed or “failed incidents” that are occurring in several locations that are permitted, at least in part, by an existing policy in the Glendale Fire Department.

Description of Slides

Three Daily Activity Logs selected at random of Engine Company 27 showing responses to emergency medical calls from Brand Park, which is located at the periphery of the fire district, and the three dispatch logs showing the time it took to get to the scenes of the three calls. All travel times from Brand Park to the scene of the medical emergencies are between 50% and 100% longer than the average response time of this engine company. Had they responded from their centrally located neighborhood fire station, they would have arrived on each of these calls at or under their average response time of about four minutes.

Slide # 1: Daily Activity Log showing Engine 27 firefighters jogging in Brand Park.

Slide # 2: Dispatch Log showing response time from Brand Park, taking six minutes to arrive at the scene of a medical emergency.

Slide # 3: Daily Activity Log showing Engine 27 firefighters jogging in Brand Park.

Slide # 4:Dispatch Log showing response time from Brand Park, taking seven minutes to arrive at the scene of an injury traffic collision on the freeway.

Slide # 5: S-5 meaning a possible fatality.

Slide # 6: Daily Activity Log showing Engine 27 firefighters jogging in Brand Park.

Slide # 7: Dispatch Log showing response time from Brand Park, taking eight minutes to arrive at the scene of a traffic collision on the 134 Freeway that may require a rescue from a trapped vehicle.

Slide # 8: Daily Activity Log showing Engine 28 firefighters jogging in an unapproved remote location in its fire district.

Slides 9, 10, and 11: Copies of three pages of the GFD Policy and Procedure Manual, Chapter 4, that authorizes engine and truck companies to jog in remote areas of their fire district or at locations outside of their fire district.

Slide # 12: Photo of map of city that depicts where the “failed incidents” or delayed emergency responses are occurring with the largest concentration occurring in south Glendale.

Slide # 13: Copy of page 29 of Civic Technology’s consulting report that speculates on the possible causes of “failed incidents”. Question: what has the GFD identified as the causes of these delays and what has it done to correct them?

Summation:

Questions: What has the GFD identified as the causes of these delays in Fire District 27 and what has it done to correct them? What has the GFD done to identify and remedy the larger problem in south Glendale th at shows the highest number of “failed incidents”?

There is a military term that is applicable to this issue. It is known as the Desired Point of Maximum Impact. In military terms it means the precise target point to be hit by a military weapon. In the fire service this term should reinforce what are known as the Best Practice and Geographic Integrity; that being the desired point for maximum impact for emergency response is when the firefighters and equipment are in their centrally located district fire stations. When firefighters are in their Desired Point of Maximum Impact, they can respond to any location in their district within four minutes. But when they are in violation of this Best Practice and violating Geographic Integrity their response time can take as long as eight minutes. At least that is the amount of time determined by a sampling of runs as you have just seen.

The public should not have to wait until the fire department hears the entire series of presentations to respond to the critical issue of slow emergency responses. The rest of the report that the fire department has been instructed to create in response to our material is not critical to life-threatening emergencies and therefore can be postponed until after the final presentation is made. But the policy that creates delayed responses should be examined and reported immediately. Top management in the fire department has an ethical and professional obligation to report back to the city and public as soon as possible. A top fire manager is present. Maybe he would like to address this issue. The public deserves to hear from our fire department, with specifics, sooner than later.