08-17-09, Bruce Philpott Responds to the Glendale News-Press Editorial Regarding Fire Department Critics

The purpose of the GNP Editorial of 8-7-09, Fire Department Deserves Recognition, was intended to shame and silence critics of the Glendale Fire Department. The editorial tried to make a connection between the “fire critics” and two fire related incidents that occurred the first week of August. One was a brush fire and the other was a house fire where a firefighter suffered second and third degrees burns over 20% of his body. The editorial said in part: “To the critics who’ve blasted the fire department . . . We hope they also took notice of the firefighter who is still coping with third-degree burns to 20% of his body that he sustained while battling a house blaze. . “. The question is, did the editorial legitimately connect the fire critics to these two incidents?

One of the incidents was a brush fire. The writer of this editorial must be a recent implant to So. California. He or she describes the Glen Oaks Canyon fire as a “serious urban brush fire”. The writer obviously doesn’t understand that all brush fire destruction potential to both life and property is measured primarily by wind speed, coupled with fuel (dryness and abundance of brush) and temperature. Fortunately for the firefighters and hillside residents, wind was not in play during this small and easily controlled brush fire. Some will remember the last time wind was in play at a brush fire east of the 2 Freeway. Santa Ana winds were so powerful that they drove the fire right through several hundred homes, leaving nothing but ash in its wake, in spite of the fact there were hundreds of firefighters on scene.

This time around, an LAFD fire captain who was present described the event as minor in that there was the absence of wind. He accurately predicted that the fire would burn upslope to the ridge and then stop, partially aided by aerial drops. The ground units, of which he said were more numerous than necessary, made sure there were no flare ups from embers.

The editorial also inaccurately references the Glendale Fire Department as being Class I, again displaying poor knowledge of the subject. Class ratings are given to cities and not fire departments. Had the writer done some research, he or she would have discovered that there are cities rated Class I that have all volunteer fire departments. Class ratings have as much to do with the infrastructure of a city, such as water supply and pressure, roadways and supply of hydrants, as with fire departments themselves.

This brings into question why the GNP editorial would state that this small brush fire “was just the latest example of why we as a city pay a premium to have a Class I department”. The editorial staff instead should be questioning why other cities in LA County that have Class I ratings staff their engines the same way the so called “critics” have advocated? These Class I cities don’t pay that premium staffing, yet they measure up to Class I performance. To put the class ratings into perspective, the city of Burbank is Class II and Pasadena is Class III. But their fire departments perform at the same level as Glendale’s and their residents pay the same amount of fire insurance.

The second incident used in the editorial that was meant to shame the fire critics involved a serious burn injury to a firefighter at a house fire. When injuries to public safety personnel occur there is always an outpouring of public sympathy and concern and well it should.

When events leading up to these kinds of injuries are dissected, they often identify one or more procedural or human errors. But fire departments protect their dirty laundry from public view.

The Glendale Fire Department’s official press release on the house fire leaves questions unanswered as to how the firefighter sustained his injuries. If he was ventilating the roof, as has been rumored, he might have been in too much of a hurry because, according to the press release, the crew on the first arriving engine was already inside the house attacking the fire. Before they entered, the captain told dispatch that “fire was showing on the second floor”. With no water supply from a hydrant, the entry team had about a minute or so of water available from the 500 gallons aboard the engine. Knowing this, the ventilation process might have been accelerated beyond sound protocol. Unless the burning structure is sufficiently ventilated to allow the heat and gases to escape, the entry team is placed in a far more hazardous environment than is safe or necessary, especially when it has a very short supply of water. The only exception would be to try and rescue people trapped inside, but that was not the case.

By committing all of the firefighters on the first engine to the entry team, the captain would have compromised his position as incident commander. It is his responsibility to direct other incoming fire suppression resources that are essential in mounting a safe and effective extinguishment of the fire. That process cannot be accomplished with his attention being diverted to being a member of the entry team. That kind of hurried operations invites human error.

If the injured firefighter was part of the initial entry team with the structure not yet ventilated and only a minute or so of water supply, he was placed in a greater hazardous environment than necessary.

Both the national fire chiefs and fire union associations agree that most fatalities and injuries at structure fires are preventable. Examining the causes of injuries can result in procedural and training modifications to reduce future injuries. A prolonged injury to one firefighter will cost the public far more than it would to rebuild the entire burned out structure. That is a good reason for firefighters to be less aggressive and more cautious at a structure fire. But a far more important reason is to prevent the terrible suffering of injuries or loss of life.

For several years fire departments have been reporting to a national data base on what they call “Near Misses”. These reports identify contributing factors associated with incidents where firefighters came close to being injured or killed. Of the 1702 near miss incidents now in the data bank, only 27 were identified as being understaffed. This is less than 2%. In the case of the house fire, there were 44 firefighters on scene. Certainly there was no issue of understaffing. The same holds true for the brush fire incident. The data reports that more than half of all “Near Misses” fall into four categories: Situational awareness, Decision making, Human error, and Individual action. The public will never know if one or more of these categories played a role in the severe injury this firefighter sustained.

Instead of attacking citizens who have criticized bad government policies, the GNP would better serve its readership if it pursued accountability in government, including those considered political sacred cows. It is more important to prevent the injury of another firefighter than to chide members of the public who are seeking fiscal and common-sense policy reforms. The language and tone of this editorial is clearly driven by emotion, devoid of the kind of reasoned analysis and journalistic standards readers expect from a supposedly professional newspaper. My conclusion is that the GNP Editorial failed in its attempt to make the connection between these two fire incidents and the ubiquitous “fire critics”.

Bruce Philpott